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INTRODUCTION
Until recently, media-rich online interactions were mostly unidirec-
tional: multimedia content was delivered by the service provider to the
user. Input from the user came almost exclusively in the form of text.'
Even when searching the Internet for images or audio, a user typically en-
tered text into a search engine.2 In addition, search engines indexed
multimedia content by analyzing not the content itself but the text sur-
rounding it.3 This is rapidly changing. With the rise of multimedia-capable
smartphones and wireless broadband, applications that allow users to
search using non-textual inputs are quickly becoming popular. These ap-
plications go much further than simply allowing content to be uploaded
and shared, which is already common to Web 2.0 applications; they actu-
ally respond to the user based on the input media. For example, Google
Goggles uses an image taken with the camera built into a user's phone as
an input for a search, and Shazam5 and Midomi' allow users to search for
music by transmitting a short clip recorded with their phone. Some of the-
se applications even engage users in helping index content by having them
sing specific songs into their service. Finally, video games such as The
Beatles: Rock Band' use actual voices and instrument-like controls as in-
puts, and match them to the music of popular songs. These applications
represent a new and growing category that I term media-rich input applica-
tions (MRIAs).
While issues of copyright infringement on the Internet have been ad-
dressed previously, MRIAs raise the possibility of a new form of liability
1. See, e.g., FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2010) (text search for
photographs); PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2010) (text-based search
for certain artist or song plays audio similar to that artist or song); YOuTUBE, http://
www.youtube.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2010) (text search for videos).
2. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 3.50 (2009) ("There is no current
available method to search by image (or sound for that matter). As a result, a request for an image
must be generated and processed as a textual inquiry."); James Grimmelmann, The Structure of
Search Engine Law, 93 IowA L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (noting that most search queries are textual).
3. See PATRY, supra note 2, § 3.50 ("In order to return a relevant image search query,
image search algorithms analyze text that accompanies the Web pages that link to the URL on
which the image file actually resides."). Web pages are text documents that include special tags
that refer to non-textual objects, such as images. Web crawlers analyze the text around the image
tag, as opposed to the image itself. See Text vs Images, FEEDTHEBOT.COM, http://
www.feedthebot.com/textversusimages.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
4. Google Goggles for Android, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/mobile/goggles/ (last
visited Apr. 28, 2010).
5. SHAZAM, http://www.shazam.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
6. MIDOMI, http://www.midomi.com (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
7. Search for Music, MIDOMI, http://www.midomi.com/index.php?action=main.sing&
from=topnav (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
8. THE BEATLESIM: RoCK BANDrM, http://www.thebeatlesrockband.com (last visited
Apr. 28, 2010).
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that has not yet been addressed. Professor James Grimmelmann attempted
to analyze questions of copyright liability in the context of Internet search
engines by mapping out the different information flows involved with
searching the Internet and examining how the law balances the interests of
different players against each other.9 He categorized the different players
in search engine applications as users, search engine providers, and con-
tent owners.'o The growth of MRIAs leads to the potential rise of a new
liability not addressed by Professor Grimmelmann-liability for copyright
infringement by users of search engines and related technologies."
At first glance much of the behavior associated with MRIAs would
appear to be lawful, especially that which has a close analog to legacyl 2
search engine behavior." Just as running a textual search for "The Heebie-
Jeebies at CBGB's: A Secret History of Jewish Punk" in an attempt to lo-
cate information about the book would be completely lawful, we might
expect that taking a picture of the book's cover to accomplish the same
thing with Google Goggles would also be lawful. However, book titles are
not protected by copyright,14 while book covers are." The cover of the
9. Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 9.
10. Id.
I1. The fact that Professor Grimmelmann did not address this liability is not surprising. At
the time of his analysis, using non-textual input was not mainstream but "exotic." Id. at 8. MRIAs
have now clearly broken into the mainstream. As of February 2009, Shazam had thirty-five mil-
lion users. Shazam Celebrates 15 Million New Users in Just Six Months,
SHAZAM (Feb. 13, 2009), http://www.shazam.com/music/web/newsdetail.html?nid=
NEWS20090213095546.
12. In this Essay, I use the term "legacy" in the sense of "something coming from the
past," WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY UNABRIDGED 1290 (Philip Babcock
Gove ed., 1986) (1961), and more specifically "relating to, or being a previous or outdated com-
puter system," Legacy, MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM, http://www.meriam-webster.com/dictionary/
legacy?show=l&t=1289177695 (last visited Nov. 7, 2010).
13. See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding no liability for
Google's indexing and caching of copyrighted content). However, as Professor Jessica Litman
has pointed out, there is a lot of personal use, both on and off the Internet, that occupies a "murky
middle ground" between clearly lawful and clearly infringing. Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal
Use, 85 TEx. L. REV. 1871, 1901 (2007). Professor Litman defines "personal use" as an individ-
ual making a copy "for herself, her family, or her close friends." Id. at 1893-94. Professor
Litman's purpose in investigating this murky middle ground is to examine how users of content
contribute to the purpose of copyright and to highlight how some copying that the public consid-
ers "lawful" is not exempted by statute or judicial decision. Id. at 1878-79; see also John
Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007 UTAH L. REV.
537, 543-48 (2007) (tallying $12.45 million in statutory damages for copyright infringement for
a typical day in the life of a law professor).
14. Book titles, like titles of other works, are not protected by copyright. See I MELVILLE
B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.16 (Matthew Bender rev. ed. 2010)
("It is . . . clear, as a matter of statutory construction by the courts (as well as Copyright Office
Regulations), that titles may not claim statutory copyright.").
15. See Conde Nast Publ'ns, Inc. v. Vogue Sch. of Fashion Modelling, Inc., 105 F.
Supp. 325, 332 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (holding that magazine covers are entitled to copyright pro-
tection).
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book used in this example has, in fact, two protected elements: one for
the cover design and the other for the photograph of the Ramones in-
cluded in the design. Therefore, a search using Google Goggles, which
digitizes the image on the book cover and transmits it across the Internet,
may violate a copyright owner's exclusive rights in a way that the textual
search does not. While service providers are protected from liability for
copyright infringement by a variety of affirmative defenses and statutory
safe harbors, these defenses are largely inapplicable to user interaction
with MRIAs.
There are three unique attributes of MRIAs that differentiate them
from legacy web behavior and therefore require new analysis.'" First,
unlike legacy search applications in which the service provider makes a
copy and presents it to the user, MRIA behavior requires the user to
make a copy and present it to the service provider. Thus, the image of the
book cover in the previous example is digitized by the user and sent to
Google; it is not copied by Google and sent to the user in response to a
search. 7 Second, the copied content is not necessarily from the Internet;
in our example it is from a physical book. Third, some of these tech-
nologies create derivative works in a way that simple web searching and
indexing does not. This Essay examines how these unique features of
MRIAs interact with current copyright doctrine and how the lack of pro-
tection for users may discourage innovation by developers of this new
and exciting technology.' This Essay also proposes a new user safe har-
bor that balances the interests of users in using MRIAs with the interests
of copyright owners in protecting their exclusive rights.
This Essay proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides a tax-
onomy of MRIAs and provides examples of each type. In addition, this
part discusses in more detail the ways in which MRIAs are distinct from
legacy web activity. Part II describes current copyright doctrine, espe-
cially as applied to situations most similar to MRIA behavior. It
discusses how copyright doctrine might be over-inclusive when applied
to MRIA behavior, while the defenses against infringement are under-
inclusive. Part III discusses the ways in which users' potential liability
16. This differentiates this Essay from previous scholarship regarding application of
copyright law to computer technology. See, e.g., Grimmelmann, supra note 2; Mark A. Lem-
ley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REv. 547 (1997);
Miquel Peguera, When the Cached Link Is the Weakest Link: Search Engine Caches Under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 56 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 589 (2009).
17. There are legacy applications that allow user-supplied content. Such content is, in
fact, a hallmark of what has been termed Web 2.0. For a discussion of how such applications
differ from MRIAs, see infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
18. See Litman, supra note 13, at 1882 (arguing that the purpose of copyright law is as
much for benefit of people who read, listen, and view content as it is for authors who create
it).
Media Rich Input Application Liability
can harm innovation and copyright law generally. This part also proposes
a user safe harbor that balances the need to protect users with the inter-
ests of copyright owners. A short conclusion follows.
I. MEDIA-RICH INPUT APPLICATIONS
MRIAs vary widely in what they do and how users interact with
them. In order to address the legal issues, it is helpful to try to divide
these behaviors into categories. I term these categories searching, stock-
ing, and matching. This Part discusses these categories in detail, with
examples of each. It then explains which unique features of MRIAs dif-
ferentiate them from legacy applications in ways that have important
implications for how copyright doctrine treats them.
A. Searching
Media-rich input searching is analogous to textual searching on the
Web, which causes the search engine to output results. Results of textual
searches may be textual (for example, links to websites) or non-textual
(such as audio or video clips). Media-rich input searching works in a
very similar fashion, except that the input is non-textual. Like a textual
search, the results of a media-rich input search may be textual or non-
textual.
Google Goggles and Retreivr are two media-rich input search appli-
cations that use images as inputs for searches. Google Goggles is
available for Android-based smartphones, through which it takes a cap-
tured image as input for a search.' 9 For example, a user can take a picture
of a book cover and retrieve search results such as links to reviews of the
book and online stores that sell the book.20 Other uses promoted by
Google include taking pictures of artwork, wine labels, and architectural
landmarks.2 Retrievr, a web-based service, allows users to search by
22
sketching a picture using their mouse. Retreivr uses that sketch as an
input to search for images stored on Flickr.com.2 These two services
demonstrate two approaches to MRIAs. While Google Goggles takes as
input a captured image, Retrievr takes as input an approximate image,
created by the user.24
19. Google Goggles, supra note 4.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Retrievr - Search by Sketch / Search by Image, RETRIEVR, http://iabs.systemone.at/
retrievr/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
23. About Retrievr, RETRIEVR, http://Iabs.systemone.at/retrievr/about (last visited Apr.
28, 2010).
24. Retrievr - Search by Sketch, supra note 22.
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Shazam and Midomi are both smartphone-enabled applications that
allow users to search for information about music by capturing a clip of
the music as input. 25 For example, if a user wants information about a
song playing in a club, they hold their phone up and transmit a clip of
the song to Shazam; Shazam then retrieves the name of the song, the
name of the artist, and links to videos of the song or online stores offer-
26ing digital copies of the song. Midomi goes a step further, allowing a
user to search by humming or singing the song into their phone or com-
puter.27 Again, this illustrates two approaches to input. The first, like
Google Goggles, takes as input a captured version of the item to be
searched for-in this case a digitized recording of the original sound
recording. The second, like Retrievr, takes as input a user approximation
of the item-here the user's own performance of the song-to be searched
for.
The development of these new services has been driven by the crea-
tion of new algorithms for creating "fingerprints" or "signatures" of non-
textual media. To work, these fingerprints need to accomplish three
things.28 First, they have to contain features that are unique to the media
object. This helps ensure the results returned are responsive to the user's
search. A fingerprint is only useful if it can return a limited number of
"suspects" and can attempt to rank them in order of most likely match to
least likely. Second, they need to be able to filter out noise in the input.
This allows them to function even if audio input was recorded in an area
with background noise or if a picture was taken in different lighting than
the original. This aspect is also important for searches that involve input
based on the user's approximation. The more robust these algorithms are
to differences between the source and the target, the better they will be
able to properly respond to not just input with background music, but
also out-of-tune singing or simple line sketches as input. Third, the fin-
25. The Ultimate Music Search, MIDoMI, http://www.midomi.com/ (last visited Apr. 28,
2010); Welcome to Shazam, SHAZAM, http://www.shazam.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
26. Welcome to Shazam, supra note 25 ("Shazam lets you discover, buy and share the
song that is playing.").
27. The Ultimate Music Search, supra note 25.
28. Avery Li-Chun Wang, An Industrial-Strength Audio Search Algorithm, I, http://
www.ee.columbia.edu/-dpwe/papers/Wang03-shazam.pdf (last visited Nov. 3, 2010) ("The
[Shazam] algorithm had to be able to recognize a short audio sample of music that had been
broadcast, mixed with heavy ambient noise, subject to reverb and other processing, captured
by a little cellphone microphone, subjected to voice codec compression, and network drop-
outs, all before arriving at our servers. The algorithm also had to perform the recognition
quickly over a large database of music with nearly 2M tracks, and furthermore have a low
number of false positives while having a high recognition rate.").
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gerprints must contain the information in as compact a manner as possi-
ble to allow for efficient searching.29
Media-rich input searching services have great potential for innova-
tion. Just as textual input applications include not just simple web
searches but also access to driving directions, price comparisons, and
translation services, media-rich input search services are similarly capa-
ble of a wide variety of functions. In fact, any legacy application that
takes text as input can be turned into a media-rich application by taking
an image of the text as input. For instance, Google has demonstrated a
new version of Google Goggles that not only searches based on the digi-
tized image, but also translates the text of the digitized image.30
B. Stocking
Stocking is, in essence, the opposite of searching. Stocking is neces-
sary in situations where the service needs information about what input
should match a known result. To this end, the service engages the user in
its indexing process. For example, to enable Midomi to search by hum-
ming or singing, it needs fingerprints of the results in its database that
can be properly compared to these inputs.' The fingerprints collected
from the original digital recordings do not serve this purpose, because
the current algorithms cannot properly compare the fingerprint of a
heavily-produced, studio-quality music track to that of a user singing or
humming. To facilitate Midomi's search by humming or singing, it en-
courages users to upload audio of themselves singing or humming the
songs. Users then place that audio in the proper place in the search in-
dex, telling the service what song they are singing or humming. 2 The
fingerprint of this audio can then be compared to later users' input hum-
ming or singing. The more users stock the index, the more likely the
service will return the proper result when a user searches by humming or
29. As an example of how this can be accomplished, the Shazam service creates finger-
prints of music by identifying "constellations" of "high energy" moments within the music.
Id. at 1-2. When a user inputs a music clip to the service, the service takes its fingerprint and
compares it to all of the fingerprints it has in its database. Id. Because background noise
should not register as "high energy," it drops out of the fingerprint. Once the clip has been
reduced to these constellations, comparing them to the database is much more efficient than if
the fingerprint contained much more data. Id.
30. Hartmut Neven, Integrating Translation into Google Goggles, GOOGLE MOBILE
BLOG (Feb. 17, 2010, 11:59 AM), http://googlemobile.blogspot.com/2010/02/integrating-
translation-into-google.html.
31. Search for Music, supra note 7 (click "Read why > >") ("When someone does a
sing search, Midomi uses Sound2Sound search science to match the voice to recordings on
midomi.com. So when people search for a top song you've recorded, they might find your
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singing. Midomi even lists "top songs" that they are looking for people
to sing.33
In the context of textual searches, there is no need for user stocking.
HTML allows for easy separation of content from presentation, so an
automated web crawler can easily ignore stylistic information, such as
font and positioning when indexing a web page, remove punctuation and
make ordering of words irrelevant. For MRIA search services that aim to
respond to the widest variety of inputs, however, it is impossible to cre-
ate indexes in an automated fashion. Stocking is, therefore, user-driven
indexing.
Reliance on user-generated indexing predates MRIAs. 4 For exam-
ple, Amazon.com allows users to upload their own images of products
they own to the product's page on Amazon.com's site." Google's Pano-
ramio allows users to upload images of geographical locations, which
are then viewable through Google Maps. In both cases, users searching
for that product or location have access to content previously uploaded
by other users. In fact, any site that features user content, such as You-
Tube, Wikipedia, or the Internet Movie Database, features this type of
activity.
Stocking is distinct from these legacy behaviors because the user-
supplied content of MRIAs does not modify or enlarge the set of content
to be searched but instead enhances the ability of users to find content
that already exists in the services' repositories. This distinction may be
especially helpful in distinguishing stocking MRIAs from legacy Peer-
to-Peer (P2P) applications. Uploading media to a P2P application such
as Grokster allowed other users to download that content.37 If no user had
uploaded the media, it would not have been available for other users, no
matter how hard they searched for it." When a user uploads a clip of
their own version of a popular song to Midomi, it does not add a copy of
33. Id.
34. In this way stocking is really a specific instance of "crowdsourcing," which is "the
act of taking a job traditionally performed by a designated agent (usually an employee) and
outsourcing it to an undefined, generally large group of people in the form of an open call."
Jeff Howe, CROWDSOURCING, http://crowdsourcing.typepad.com/ (see "Crowdsourcing: A
Definition" to the left of the postings) (last visited Sept. 14, 2010).
35. See, e.g., Customer Images for Kindle: Amazon's Original Wireless Reading Device
(Ist Generation), AMAZON.COM, http://www.amazon.com/gp/customer-medialproduct-gallery/
BOOOFI73MA (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
36. PANORAMIO, http://www.panoramio.com/ (last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
37. See Metro-Goldwyn -Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 920-21
(2005).
38. See id.
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the popular song-only a new recording of that song-to Midomi's re-
pository, making it easier for other users to find that song. 9
C. Matching
The last category of MRIA behavior, matching, is quite different
from the first two, because it does not involve a search application at all.
In addition, it occurs primarily as a video game rather than a smartphone
or web application. Matching behavior takes a user's input and compares
it to a known result to determine how closely they "match." The Beatles:
Rock Band is one of the most well-known examples of a matching
MRIA. In The Beatles: Rock Band and games such as the Guitar Hero
series, input comes in two different forms, often combined in a single
game. First, a user may match a pattern of "notes" on a game controller,
403
which resembles a musical instrument, to those presented by the game.
If the user matches the pattern, the music continues to play; if the input
does not match, the music for that instrument drops out. This creates the
illusion that the user is playing the music, even if they are not. While the
controls are more limited than actual instruments, the different instru-
ments and settings provide approximations of actually playing. For
example, using the drum controller on the "expert" level provides an ex-
perience that is almost a beat-for-beat recreation of the original song. 4 1 In
the second form of matching, the game compares the a player's vocal
pitch to the pitch of the original vocal part. The closer the user is to the
notes of the original song, the higher the score.
D. What's Unique About Media-Rich Input?
Courts and scholars have addressed some of the issues regarding the
application of copyright law to the Internet. At one end of the liability
spectrum, much search engine behavior appears to be free of liability for
service providers. 42 This includes freedom from liability for both the pro-
cess of indexing Internet content from third-party websites for later
searching and allowing users to view cached versions of that content,
39. Uploading to Midomi does make available the new performance of the song, but
when a user searches by singing into Midomi, they are likely searching for the canonical ver-
sion of the song.
40. Sound Opinions: Rock Video Games, Reviews of the Flaming Lips & the Gossip,
CHI. PUB. RADIO, (Oct. 2, 2009), http://www.soundopinions.org/shownotes/2009/
100209/shownotes.html (describing The Beatles: Rock Band gameplay).
41. ShadoeSH, The Beatles: Rock Band-Helter Skelter-Expert Drums 5*, YOuTUBE
(Sept. 6, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v-9xzCpdiFE74 (showing the beat pattern for
the song "Helter Skelter" and accompanying audio when played on "expert" mode in The
Beatles: Rock Band).
42. See, e.g., Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com. Inc.. 487 F.3d 701 (9th Cir. 2007); Field
v. Google. Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
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including thumbnail images.43 While the numerous and interrelated rea-
sons for this are discussed below, most derive from the voluntary and
mostly open nature of the Internet. That is, people who publish content
to publicly-available areas of the Internet do so because they want users
to consume that content. By indexing and caching, search engines help
enable this." At the opposite end of the liability spectrum, users may be
found liable for wholesale, non-transformative copying of media to the
Internet, even if their use is non-commercial. 4 5 Further, service providers
who induce users to make such copies may be held liable for indirect
infringement, even if the service has substantial legitimate uses.46 The
use of MRIAs does not fit either end of the liability spectrum: the copy-
ing is not of content that was previously published on the Internet, and
the copying is not generally wholesale copying.47 Therefore, the liability
created from use of MRIAs needs a more nuanced analysis that places
MRIAs on the spectrum of liability in light of their unique attributes.
First, unlike legacy applications that return multimedia results to the
user, MRIAs require the user to do the copying. This differentiates use of
MRIAs from the standard liability-free behavior of legacy search en-
gines. Legacy indexing, caching, and searching behavior require the
service provider to make the copy.48 A service provider reaches out via a
web crawler to retrieve, index, and cache content. When the user con-
43. See Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 725 (remanding where the fair use defense was likely to
prevail against infringement claim for search engine image indexing); Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d
at 1123-24 (holding that caching files on a search engine constitutes fair use).
44. See discussion infra Part lI.C.
45. See, e.g., Religious Tech. Cent. v. Lerma, No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131 (E.D.
Va. Oct. 4, 1996) (holding an individual liable for copyright infringement for posting Church
of Scientology documents to a newsgroup).
46. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005)
(holding that an Internet service that promotes its use to infringe copyright is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the service even though lawful uses of the
service exist).
47. MRIA behaviors, especially stocking, are different from P2P behaviors, because
they facilitate searching for content that already exists in a repository rather than simply add-
ing content to that repository. See supra notes 37-39 and accompanying text. P2P applications
are condemned not because they create a new form of infringement, but because they make
mass infringement almost effortless using the Internet. See Tehranian, supra note 13, at 549
(viewing P2P networks as vastly expanding the scope of piracy that previously existed with
copying albums to cassettes). Companies that facilitated mass copying of cassette tapes have
been held liable for indirect infringement. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 114 F.
Supp. 2d 896, 916-17 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (citing A & M Records, Inc. v. Gen. Audio Video
Cassettes, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 1449 (C.D. Cal. 1996); RCA Records v. All-Fast Sys., Inc., 594
F. Supp. 335 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)). Under a similar theory, P2P services such as Napster have
been found liable for facilitating user infringement. See, e.g., Napster, 114 F. Supp. 2d at 916-
17. Because MRIAs do not allow sharing of content between users, they do not have a legacy
analog.
48. Copyright owners have argued unsuccessfully that browser-as opposed to system
provider-caching constituted infringement. Perfect 10, 487 F.3d at 726.
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ducts a search, the service provider makes another copy and returns it to
the user. Because the copying is done by the service provider and not the
user, any service provider liability for legacy indexing and caching
49
would be for direct infringement. With an MRIA, it is the user that cop-
ies and transmits the content. This user-copying has two consequences
for copyright liability: (1) it has the potential of shifting liability for di-
rect infringement from the service provider to the user and (2) there is
less control over the actions of users than over automated systems. Both
of these may mean that standard defenses against liability for legacy
search engine behavior do not apply to liability from use of MRIAs.'o
Second, MRIAs are more likely to get user-supplied content from
the physical world. This is one of the great innovations of MRIAs and
distinguishes them from legacy search engines that rely on web crawlers,
which only traverse the Internet. While there are other services that in-
dex from physical sources, notably the Google Books project, these are
still systematic efforts not reliant upon user input. Again, this distinction
is important in evaluating how the standard defenses to liability for
search engine behavior apply to MRIAs.
Finally, as is detailed below, some MRIA behaviors have the poten-
tial to create derivative works."' This is especially true for searching and
stocking applications that take user approximations-rather than digi-
tally captured content-as input. To the extent that these approximations
could be considered adaptations of the original work, they implicate the
derivative works right.5 2
II. CURRENT DOCTRINE
United States copyright law defines a set of rights that the copyright
owner has the exclusive right to exercise themselves or to authorize other
to exercise." As Professor Mark Lemley pointed out at a time when the
Internet was less mature, copyright doctrine might apply "too well" to
digital transmissions over the Internet, in that literal application could
expand the scope of copyright.54 This is because one transmission has the
49. See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1114 (D. Nev. 2006) (stating that
the suit against Google was for direct infringement). This is different than in the P2P context,
where service provider liability is dependent on a finding that the user directly infringed. See
Grokster, 545 U.S. 913.
50. See infra Part lI.C.
51. See infra Part II.A.3.
52. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (2006).
53. 17 U.S.C. § 106.
54. Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAY-
TON L. REv. 547, 549 (1997).
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potential to infringe more than one of the exclusive rights covered by
copyright." Copyright doctrine has evolved to better address digital
transmissions in general, and some of Professor Lemley's concerns may
have been addressed by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA).16 Even with this evolution, however, the ways in which
MRIAs' unique characteristics may violate exclusive rights illustrate a
new and potentially important strain on copyright law: a gap between
what the public believes the copyright law says and what it actually
says." While the well-publicized lawsuits brought by the Recording In-
dustry Association of America may have educated consumers about how
copyright laws can apply to them, the enthusiastic adoption of MRIAs
illustrates that users may not believe that use of these applications is in-
fringing.
This Part examines the various rights protected by current copyright
doctrine and how they apply to MRIAs.5 9 It also describes the various
forms of indirect liability and how user actions may or may not create
liability for service providers. This Part concludes with a discussion of
the affirmative defenses to copyright infringement, focusing on those
used most often to protect legacy web activity, such as indexing and
caching. This discussion also notes that these defenses are inapplicable
to MRIAs because of MRIAs' unique characteristics.
A. Rights
1. Reproduction
The reproduction right covers the most rudimentary copyright: mak-
ing copies of a work.6 Copies are defined as works "fixed by any
method now known or later developed, and from which the work can be
55. Id.
56. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006) (creating a safe harbor for simple transmission of a
document). Professor Lemley acknowledged that this might be the result of a literal applica-
tion of copyright law. Lemley, supra note 54, at 578.
57. Jessica Litman, Copyright Noncompliance (or Why We Can't "Just Say Yes" to
Licensing), 29 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 237, 238 (1997) ("[P]eople don't believe that the
copyright law says what it does say.").
58. See Brian X. Chen, 10 Most Awesome iPhone Apps of 2008, WIRED.COM (Jan. 2,
2009), http://www.wired.com/software/coolapps/news/2009/01/YE8_iphoneapps (ranking
Shazam the sixth "most awesome" iPhone app).
59. While I use specific MRIAs as examples, the liabilities discussed should not be
considered definitive for two reasons. First, as will be discussed below, some of the affirmative
defenses are quite amorphous and difficult to evaluate ex ante. Second, I am not privy to any
internal documentation of these companies that might, for example, involve explicit licenses
for some of the activity that I discuss. I have, however, examined the user-facing materials of
these applications, and have not found any explicit licenses for the user behavior that I discuss.
60. 17 U.S.C. § 106(l) (2006).
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perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or
with the aid of a machine or device.""' This fixation requirement was
construed expansively by the courts to include copies stored in a com-
puter's temporary memory.62 Concerned that this expansive view might
create liability for service providers, Congress responded by removing
the liability for service providers if those copies are made automatically
as content makes its way through a network.63
Every browsing or indexing of a web page implicates the duplication
right because it fixes a copy of the content on the computer belonging to
the browsing user or indexing service provider.6 In order for a web
browser or web crawler to read a web page, a copy of that web page
needs to be stored on the requesting machine. The Internet, therefore,
could not exist legally under a broad interpretation of the reproduction
right. Courts have sometimes addressed this issue under the doctrine of
fair use.65 In addition, scholars have addressed this issue through the im-
plied license doctrine.6 This doctrine assumes that the only purpose of
putting content on the Internet in an unsecured location is to facilitate
viewing by others. Because viewing requires copying, the copyright
owner is thought to have granted an implied license to make a copy of
the web page in order to view it.
61. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
62. See MAI Sys. Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991, F.2d 211, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); see
also U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS PURSUANT TO
SECTION 104 OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT, at xxii (2001), available at
www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-I.pdf ("[T]he making of tempo-
rary copies of a work in RAM implicates the reproduction right so long as the reproduction
persists long enough to be perceived, copied, or communicated.").
63. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2) (2006).
64. Other safe harbor exemptions of § 512 may cover the search engine's indexing and
caching behavior. See Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1123-24 (D. Nev. 2006)
(discussing DMCA caching safe harbor). But see Peguera, supra note 16, at 620-23 (arguing
that Field misinterpreted caching safe harbor).
65. See Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 726 (9th Cir. 2007) (hold-
ing that browser caching by user is fair use). Field does address a similar situation of the
caching of the material once retrieved; it does not address the original indexing, because Field
had not alleged that such indexing violated his copyright. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1115
("Field does not allege that Google committed infringement when its 'Googlebot,' like an
ordinary Internet user, made the initial copies of the Web pages containing his copyrighted
works and stores those copies in the Google cache.").
66. See Erik Ketzan, Rebuilding Babel: Copyright and the Future of Online Machine
Translation, 9 TuL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 205, 229 (2007) (citing Peter B. Hirtle, Digital
Preservation and Copyright, STANFORD COPYRIGHT & FAIR USE CENTER, http://
fairuse.stanford.edu/commentary-and-analysis/2003_11 hirtle.html (last visited May 5,
2006)); John S. Sieman, Using the Implied License to Inject Common Sense into Digital Cop-
yright, 85 N.C. L. REv. 885, 891 (2007). But see Lemley, supra note 54, at 567 (arguing that
implied license is a "weak reed"). The fair use doctrine has also, to a lesser extent, been seen
as protecting the standard use of the Internet. See id. at 567 (criticizing fair use as a defense to
ordinary net activity).
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A copy, as defined by the duplication right, is made whenever a user
digitizes and transmits a picture or audio recording of a copyrighted
work using an MRIA. This includes every time a user uses Google Gog-
gles to capture and transmit a book cover or copyrighted piece of art, or
uses Shazam to copy a few seconds of a sound recording. Unlike other
Internet activity, however, the implied license doctrine cannot protect
this conduct. Because viewing physical media does not require a copy to
be made, allowing someone to view a work in the real world does not
imply a license to copy it.67 In other words, while a web page cannot be
viewed without a copy of its contents being made, a book cover can be.6 1
2. Performance
The owner of a copyright in "literary, musical, dramatic, and cho-
reographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works" has the exclusive right to perform these works in
public.69 Like the fixation requirement of the duplication right, what con-
stitutes a performance has been construed very broadly. It includes both
the playing of a pre-recorded copyrighted work-for example, a D.J.
playing a CD in a club or at a wedding 70-as well as the performance of
a "cover" version of a song by a live band.' What constitutes a public
rather than private performance is defined by statute to include a per-
formance for a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle
67. See infra Part II.C.1 for further discussion regarding the implied license doctrine
and its inapplicability to MRIAs.
68. See Teter v. Glass Onion, Inc., No. 08-6097-CV-SJ-FJG, 2010 WL 2772198, at *4-
*6 (W.D. Mo. July 12, 2010) (requiring affirmative conduct on the part of the copyright owner
to find that an implied license was created to allow digitization and web publication of pro-
tected works). In addition, a user stocking Midomi's index by singing a song also implicates
the right of the song's composer. While owners of musical compositions are required to allow
cover versions of their works under a compulsory mechanical license, it is possible that a
recording made for stocking purposes would not qualify. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006). Of course,
even if the recordings did fall under the compulsory license, it is unlikely that either users or
Midomi are obtaining the license from the Harry Fox Agency or otherwise. See Mechanical
Licenses, HARRY Fox AGENCY, http://www.harryfox.com/public/MechanicalLicenseslic.jsp
(last visited Apr. 28, 2010).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2006).
70. See Lodge Hall Music, Inc. v. Waco Wrangler Club, Inc., 831 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.
1987).
71. See EMI April Music, Inc. v. White, 618 F. Supp. 2d 497 (E.D. Va. 2009). While the
"first sale" doctrine protects a user from liability for some activity, such as reselling or renting
out a legally purchased DVD, it does not apply to the performance right. See 2 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.14 (discussing how motion picture companies have attempted to
get around the first sale doctrine by arguing that the rental leads to an infringing public per-
formance). The legal ownership of a copy of a copyrighted work does not grant someone the
authority to play the copyrighted work publicly; for example, playing a legally purchased
DVD in a public theatre is still an infringement of the owner's performance right.
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of family and friends. 72 A public performance also includes transmitting
a performance, including a private performance, "by means of any de-
vice or process" to a substantial number of people."
After a user stocks Midomi by singing or humming a requested
song, Midomi provides the ability for the public to stream that perform-
ance at a later time. This likely would be considered a transmission to
the public and thus a public performance.74 It is important, however, to
consider each step in getting that performance to the public in order to
determine who is liable for any infringement of the performance right.
The first step, in which the user records himself, is a performance of the
musical work; it is not, however, a public performance, because it is
probably conducted privately. The second step, in which the user uploads
the recording to Midomi, also does not constitute a public performance.
The ASCAP rate court has made clear that there is a distinction between
transferring a file and performing the work.7 ' However, the third step, in
which Midomi streams the performance to the public upon request, does
constitute a public performance. Therefore, while there might be direct
liability for infringing the performance right for stocking applications
such as Midomi, it would rest with the service provider and not the user.
Some uses of matching applications present a larger concern over li-
ability for infringement of the performance right. The performance right
in musical compositions is broad enough that playing The Beatles: Rock
Band in a public tournament would likely be a public performance of the
underlying musical composition.7 If such a tournament were not a per-
formance of the musical composition, there would likely be nothing to
stop a bar from allowing patrons to play Rock Band-or even hiring
"Rock Band Experts"-instead of playing CDs or the radio, thereby
avoiding the standard ASCAP license.
72. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006) (Performing publicly means "to perform or display it at a
place open to the public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a
normal circle of a family and its social acquaintances is gathered . . .
73. Id.
74. See United States v. ASCAP, 485 F Supp. 2d 438, 442 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (streaming
of a musical work constitutes a public performance), aff'd in relevant part, 96 U.S.P.Q.2d
1360 (2d Cir. 2010).
75. Id. (holding that although "streaming of a musical work does constitute a public
performance . . . the downloading of a digital music file, in and of itself, does not"). Merely
transferring the file does not implicate the performance right because it could not be consid-
ered a performance, as it was not "transmitted in a manner designed for contemporaneous
perception." Id. at 442-43.
76. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 ("To 'perform' a work means to recite, render, play, dance, or
act it, either directly or by means of any device or process .... ); 2 NiMMER & NIMMER, supra
note 14, § 8.14 n.21 ("[A] musical work contained on the sound track, or otherwise in a mo-
tion picture or other audiovisual work, is performed by the exhibition of such audiovisual
work."). The performance would be public because it would likely be in front of a substantial
number of people who are not family or friends. See 17 U.S.C. § 101.
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In addition to the performance right in the musical composition,
there may also a performance right in the underlying video game.7 ' The
performance right of the owner of the sound recording is limited to digi-
tal audio transmissions, and so owners of sound recordings are not
entitled to a royalty for playing the radio or CD in a bar." The perform-
ance right for audiovisual works-including video games-is not
similarly limited.79 Like the soundtrack of a motion picture, the sound
recordings of the original songs are an integral part of matching video
games.o Thus, while the owner of the sound recording would not have
an infringement claim based on a public performance of a matching vid-
eo game, the video game publisher-whose rights are contingent on a
master use license from the owner of the sound recordings-might."
3. Derivative Works
In addition to making copies of copyrighted works, the copyright
owner also has the exclusive right to make derivatives, or "adaptations,"
of the original work. A derivative work is a work that is substantially
similar to the work upon which it is based and includes some amount of
originality.8 2 There is some obvious overlap between the derivative works
right and the performance right. For example, the actions of a D.J. re-
cording remixes she makes live in a club could be considered both a
77. Red Baron-Franklin Park, Inc. v. Taito Corp., 883 F.2d 275, 278-79 (4th Cir. 1989)
(holding that video games are audiovisual works and that playing these games constitutes
performances of the works). But cf Allen v. Academic Games League of Am., 89 F.3d 614
(9th Cir. 1996) (holding playing of board games-copyrighted as literary works-in a tour-
nament did not constitute a performance of those works). Matching behavior is more akin to
the video games addressed in Red Baron because it involves repetitive sequences of images
and audio, a feature of the game at issue in Red Baron that was relied upon by the court. Red
Baron, 883 F2d at 279 (citing Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 874 (3d
Cir. 1982)).
78. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2006).
79. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 106(4); Red Baron, 883 F.2d at 278 ("[V]ideo games are
copyrightable as audiovisual works . . . .").
80. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (stating that audiovisual works include "accompanying
sounds," and that sound recordings do not include "the sounds accompanying a motion picture
or other audiovisual work . .. "); see also I NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 2.09 (stating
that a soundtrack constitutes integral part of a motion picture).
81. Some matching applications use "sound-alike" versions of the songs. These do not
require a license from the owner of the sound recording, but they do require a synchronization
license from the owner of the musical composition. See The Romantics v. Activision Publ'g,
Inc., 532 F. Supp. 2d 884, 887 (E.D. Mich. 2008) (discussing a situation in which the maker of
Guitar Hero acquired a synchronization license from the owners of the musical composition
"What I Like About You," but re-recorded the song instead of using the version originally
recorded by the Romantics).
82. E.g., 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.09.
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public performance of the original songs and the creation of a derivative
work from those works 3
Because of this requirement of original creativity, compression of
copyrighted audio or visual works to facilitate replaying the original
work is not considered to be a creation of a derivative work but rather of
a copy, thereby implicating only the reproduction right." However, when
someone creatively alters a copyrighted work, a derivative work is cre-
ated.
Concerns over infringement of the derivative works right are espe-
cially relevant for searching and stocking applications that take user
approximations as input, such as by humming or singing with Midomi or
sketching with Retrievr. Whether MRIA behaviors implicate the deriva-
tive works right may be a very fact-specific determination. Sketching a
rough approximation of the Guggenheim Museum Bilbao into Retrievr
could be considered making a derivative work of Frank Gehry's architec-
tural work." The more specific the directions from MRIAs to users
regarding the best ways to provide input, the more likely users may be to
create derivative works. For example, Midomi asks that users upload
songs sung without background music to better enable the sound match-
ing technologies.6 As another example, imagine an MRIA that stocked
an image search index by having users trace over images, instructing
them on how to mark common elements like people's faces. The user
would have created an adaptation of the original image for use in the
service's index.
Going a step further, a derivative work may be created even when an
automated algorithm compresses digital content for a purpose other than
playing it back later, such as the fingerprinting done by Shazam and Mi-
domi. While there is no human author of each compression, there is
83. It is unclear whether the recording is necessary for the implication of the derivative
works right. The Ninth Circuit requires fixation for protection of the derivative work but not
for finding that it infringed the original rights holder's rights. Micro Star v. Formgen, Inc., 154
F.3d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 964
F.2d 965, 967-68 (9th Cir. 1992)). But see 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.09 (not-
ing that the language in Galoob was dicta and arguing that fixation should be required to
infringe the derivative works right). In fact, according to Nimmer on Copyright, there can be
no infringement of the derivative works right without infringement of either the performance
right or the duplication right. Id.
84. KENT D. STUCKEY, INTERNET AND ONLINE LAW, § 6.08 (2009). But see Michael J.
Madison, What's My Copy Right?, 48 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 787, 791 (2001) (suggest-
ing that making MP3s from a CD may be the creation of derivative works).
85. See Tehranian, supra note 13, at 545 (stating that such a sketch could be considered
an infringement).
86. Search for Music, supra note 7.
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creativity that goes into the algorithm itself." This is similar to the argu-
ment that ad-blocking software creates a derivative work of the website,
as both involve an automated modification of a copyrighted work." As
another example, in the early days of the Web, there was a "Zippy Filter"
that would automatically populate web pages specified by the user with
randomly inserted catch phrases from the Zippy the Pinhead comic
strip."9 The resulting web pages would be considered infringing under
some interpretations of the derivative works right.90 Finally, others have
argued that automated translations should be found to infringe the de-
rivative works right, just as human translations do.9'
Likewise, Shazam relies upon what may be considered derivative
works. Shazam uses an algorithm for "fingerprinting" audio that is ro-
bust to external sounds and needs only a short bit of a recording." This is
not a duplication, because Shazam's fingerprint cannot be used to play
the original clip. Instead, the result is a creative transformation of the
original work that serves the purpose of comparing against a catalog of
sound clips. Therefore, unlike an audio file compressed as an MP3, it
may be a derivative work.93
87. A derivative work, like all works to which copyright protection extends, must be an
"original work of authorship." 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-102 (2006). "The ownership of that copy-
right vests initially in the author. . . of the work." 17 U.S.C. § 201(a) (2006). The author must
contribute a "modicum of creativity" to the work for copyright protection. Feist Publ'ns, Inc.
v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991). If the originality comes from an automated
process and not a human, there is an argument that the resulting work has no copyright protec-
tion, because it has no author. Some courts have found, however, that a work does not need to
qualify as a derivative work to infringe the derivative works right, and therefore these courts
have not required originality or authorship to find infringement. See Galoob, 964 F.2d at 967-
68.
88. See Anne Broache & Declan McCullagh, Web Ad Blocking May Not Be (Entirely)
Legal, CNET NEWS (Sept. 14, 2007), http://news.cnet.com/Web-ad-blocking-may-not-be-
entirely-legal---page-2/2100-1030_3-6207936-2.html?tag=mncol (citing In re Aimster Copy-
right Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647-48 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that commercial-free copies of
television shows are derivative works)).
89. See Zippy Meets Meta-HTML, META-HTML, http://web.archive.org/web/
19981205194228/www.metahtml.com/apps/zippy/welcome.mhtml (last visited Apr. 28,
2010).
90. See Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107, 1111 n.4 (9th Cir. 1998) (recording
an automatically pink-tinged television program would create an infringing derivative work).
91. See Ketzan, supra note 66, at 226-27 (arguing that using an online translation ser-
vice would open up the user to copyright infringement for creation of a derivative work).
92. See Wang, supra note 28, at 1-2.
93. Service providers would argue that this analysis weighs in favor of fair use, because
it is a "transformative use." See infra Part II.C.3. This argument might carry weight if it is
difficult to show that the original work is "incorporated" into the fingerprint. See Lewis Ga-
loob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc. 964 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1992) ("A derivative work
must incorporate a protected work in some concrete or permanent 'form.' "). While courts
more often tangle with the issue of permanence, the argument here would be that there is noth-
ing left of the original work in the fingerprint after the algorithm has been run on the music
clip. Compare id. at 967-68 (enhancing audiovisual display is not permanent or concrete),
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4. Distribution
A copyright owner also has the exclusive right to distribute his works
to the public. 94 Some MRIAs, such as Midomi, allow content uploaded
during stocking to be downloaded by other users. It is possible that this
would infringe the distribution right.95 Users would not face potential for
liability for violation of the distribution right for their interaction with
the MRIA, because the service provider rather than the users makes the
copies available. Any liability would, therefore, be identical to that
which currently exists for sites that host user-generated content, such as
YouTube.com." Therefore, there is no need to address any unique as-
pects of the distribution right in relation to MRIAs.
B. Indirect Liability
In addition to direct infringement liability for the party actually mak-
ing the copy, third parties face potential liability for copyright
infringement. Indirect infringement comes in three court-created forms:
contributory infringement, inducement, and vicarious liability. For each
of these, direct infringement is a prerequisite for indirect liability. In oth-
er words, where each individual behavior does not infringe, there is no
liability for aggregate behavior. Therefore, there is no indirect liability
where the individuals' behaviors are exempted from liability solely be-
cause of an affirmative defense, such as fair use.
1. Contributory Infringement
Contributory infringement requires a finding that the third party had
knowledge of the infringing activity and took action contributing to that
infringement.97 The Supreme Court limited the scope of contributory
with Micro Star, 154 F.3d at I 11-12 (detailed description of an audiovisual display "counts
as a permanent or concrete form"). In other words, it would not be considered an "abridgment,
condensation, . . . recast[ing], transform[ation], or [adaptation]." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). This
highlights the tension that has been discussed by others between derivative works and trans-
formative use. See Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free
Speech and How Copying Serves It, I14 YALE L.J. 535, 551 (2004).
94. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2006).
95. See Hotaling v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 118 F.3d 199, 203 (4th
Cir. 1997) ("[A] library may lend an authorized copy of a book that it lawfully owns without
violating the copyright laws. However, distributing unlawful copies of a copyrighted work
does violate the copyright owner's distribution right and, as a result, constitutes copyright
infringement." (citations omitted)).
96. Jacqueline C. Charlesworth, Myspace, Youtube and User-Supplied Content: Key
Copyright Issues, in UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 2007, at 253 (Practising Law Institute,
2007).
97. See Gershwin Publ'g Corp. v. Columbia Artists Mgmt., Inc., 443 F.2d 1159, 1162
(2d Cir. 1971) ("[Olne who, with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or
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infringement in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, where
it held that if a product is widely used for legitimate, non-infringing
purposes, the makers of that product are not liable for contributory
infringement." Because an MRIA service provider is supplying the
application, they would likely be found to have contributed to any user
infringement. Therefore, whether the service provider would be liable
for contributory infringement would depend on whether they had
knowledge of the infringement and whether the service had significant
non-infringing uses. For most MRIAs, it would seem that the service
provider would have knowledge of the infringement: Midomi requests
users to record specific copyrighted songs; Google promotes the use of
Google Goggles with books, which involves transmitting images of
copyrighted images on book covers; and the makers of The Beatles:
Rock Band supply an application that they know allows public
performance of the copyrighted music it contains.
The more difficult question is whether the application has significant
non-infringing uses. Matching video games would seem to fall into this
category, where use in the home with friends and family is likely the
most common use." Because substantial use does not mean a majority of
use,'0 the providers of other MRIAs would also seem to be free from
liability for contributory infringement. For example, an image search
service, such as Google Goggles, can work with non-copyrighted art-
work and audio search services with public domain songs. As will be
seen next, however, this may not protect them from liability for inducing
infringement.
2. Inducement
While Sony limited the scope of contributory infringement, Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster Ltd. created a new form of indi-
materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another, may be held liable as a 'contribu-
tory' infringer." (footnote omitted)).
98. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 442 (1984) (applying
patent law's "staple article of commerce" doctrine to copyright law).
99. Finding that this was not significant would seem to render makers of CD players
liable, since they have the potential of turning every music CD into a commercial public per-
formance.
100. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 444 (finding that "the evidence concerning sports, religious,
educational, and other programming was sufficient to establish a significant quantity of broad-
casting whose copying is now authorized" even though it did not necessarily represent a
majority of the use (internal quotation marks omitted)). The case law has not helped to define
what amount of non-infringing use is necessary for it to be considered "significant." See Assaf
Jacob & Zoe Argento, To Cache or Not to Cache-That is the Question; P2P "System Cach-
ing"-The Copyright Dilemma, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 421,477-80 (2010).
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rect liability known as inducement.'" In Grokster, the defendant P2P ap-
plication providers were held liable for copyright infringement because
they had "induced" copyright infringement by taking affirmative steps to
foster infringement,"2 including a concerted effort through advertise-
ments and the general business plan to recruit former Napster users after
that P2P service was shut down."o3 Unlike contributory infringement, the
fact that the challenged services had non-infringing uses did not protect
them from inducement liability."" The makers of stocking applications
could fall into the category of inducing infringement if they encourage
users to stock the index with versions of copyrighted material. For ex-
ample, Midomi advertises on their site the specific copyrighted songs
with which they are hoping to stock their index.0 o5 Even though these
stocking applications have non-infringing uses as well-i.e., stocking the
index with non-copyrighted material-targeted marketing might weigh
in favor of a finding of inducement.
3. Vicarious Liability
Vicarious liability requires a finding that the third party had the right
and ability to supervise the infringing behavior and received a direct fi-
nancial incentive to allow the infringement to continue. The prototypical
case for vicarious liability is the organizer of a flea market, who knows
that infringing products are sold by flea market vendors and who re-
ceives money from those vendors.'" While the financial benefit directly
linked to infringing activities does not need to be a substantial portion of
the defendant's income for a finding of vicarious liability, it does need to
be a "draw" for consumers such that if the infringement were curtailed a
significant number of consumers might not buy the product or service.1o7
This is a fact-specific inquiry. Because the business plans involved with
101. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 936-37
(2005).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 937-38.
104. See id. at 952 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting that services in Grokster had a similar
amount of non-infringing use as the VCR had in Sony). The Grokster opinion has been criti-
cized because it could be interpreted more expansively than the Court may have intended. See
Rebecca Tushnet, Discussion of Legality of Apple's "Rip. Mix. Bum." Ad Campaign, RE-
BECCA TUSHNET's 43(B)LOG (June 30, 2005, 12:48 AM), http://tushnet.blogspot.com/2005/06/
ive-been-trying-to-follow-grokster.html (arguing that Apple might be liable for infringement
under the inducement doctrine for its ad campaign encouraging users to "Rip. Mix. Bum.").
105. Search for Music, supra note 7 (listing "top songs needed"). As another example,
the Google Goggles website uses a copyrighted book cover as an example of the type of use
envisioned by the developers. Google Goggles for Android, supra note 4.
106. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.. 76 F.3d 259 (9th Cir. 1996).
107. Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004); see also 3 NIMMER &
NIMMER, supra note 14, § 12.04.
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various MRIAs are sometimes difficult to discern, it is hard to know the
degree to which MRIAs receive a financial benefit for allowing the in-
fringement. It does seem that a significant number of users might not use
an audio searching application, such as Shazam, if it did not allow
searching for copyrighted material. On the other hand, image searching
applications, such as Google Goggles, might not lose a significant num-
ber of users if it only identified art works in the public domain. Further,
because Google does not charge separately for Google Goggles, the cop-
yright owner might need to show that a significant number of consumers
might not buy an Android-equipped phone because it lacked the ability
to run Google Goggles.
C. Affirmative Defenses
Even if a party has engaged in one of the behaviors discussed above,
they may still not be liable for copyright infringement based on a variety
of affirmative defenses. This section discusses those defenses, how they
have applied to prior Internet activity, and how the unique behavior in-
volved with MRIAs may make them less applicable for users of these
new applications.
1. Implied License
As discussed above,as the implied license doctrine is often cited as
showing that standard web behavior, such as browsing, does not infringe
owners' copyrights. Field v. Google, Inc. put this theory, among other
defense theories, to the test in the context of caching.'09 The plaintiff in
Field was a lawyer who wrote short stories and published them on a per-
sonal website for the specific purpose of suing Google after it indexed
and cached them. Field argued that Google infringed his copyright by
providing cached copies of his protected content."o The court granted
summary judgment for Google, holding that Field granted Google an
implied license by posting content to the Internet and choosing not to use
well-known industry standards to prevent a web crawler from indexing
(or caching) that content."'
There are, however, significant problems with the application of the
implied license theory to search engine activity. First, the finding of an
implied license has been criticized because it presumes a contract be-
108. See supra Part I1.A.I.
109. Field v. Google, Inc, 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106 (D. Nev. 2006).
110. Id. at lll4.
Ill. Id. atlll16.
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tween Field and Google, which clearly did not exist.H2 The implied li-
cense doctrine was originally developed to fill contractual gaps to ensure
that parties got what they bargained for. Therefore, implied licenses tra-
ditionally apply to existing contracts. Simply placing material on the
Internet does not create any such contract between the poster and poten-
tial readers."' Even if it was appropriate to find an implied license in
Field, where the author had published the material on the Internet with-
out any restrictions on access, this may be of limited use in other cases.
As Professor Lemley has pointed out, because owners can condition a
license through terms on a website, implied licenses work well when
they are least needed: "those cases in which the copyright owner really
does not object to the copying, and so has no inclination to sue."" 4
To the extent that the implied license doctrine applies to legacy web
activity, it fails completely when applied to MRIA behavior. First, exist-
ing copyright doctrine is very clear that while the published nature of a
work can be considered as part of a fair use analysis, mere publication
does not imply a license to copy."' Often, the specific purpose of publi-
cation is to benefit financially from the creative work. A book publisher
does not place a book in a bookstore to allow people to copy it, but ra-
ther to allow people to purchase it. Even content made available at no
cost to the consumer does not carry with it a license to copy the work.
Music over the radio can be listened to by the public for free, but that
does not imply a license to play that music in a public location. There-
fore, an implied license defense would not protect the person who uses
an image search application in a bookstore to find out more information
about a book on sale. Even if there is a contractual nexus between the
consumer and the bookstore that allows the user to browse the books in
the store, there is none between the consumer and the publisher as would
be required for the consumer to copy the book covers. Likewise, a per-
son who uses an audio search application in her car to purchase the song
she hears on the radio from iTunes has no contract with-and receives
no license from-the song's composer.
Matching applications, like The Beatles: Rock Band, do have a con-
tractual nexus in the purchase of the game and so may have a stronger
implied license argument. As with anything that is implied, defining the
boundaries of the license is very difficult. If, for example, the purchase
112. See, e.g., Orit Fischman Afori, Implied License: An Emerging New Standard in
Copyright Law, 25 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 275, 314 (2008).
113. See, e.g., id.
114. Lemley, supra note 54, at 567.
115. 1 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 4.02 (explaining that common law copy-
right historically extended only to the right of first publication, but not under modem
copyright statutes).
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of The Beatles: Rock Band implies a license to some sort of public per-
formance of the game, it is difficult to determine the extent of such a
license. Would the determination depend on the number of people play-
ing in or watching the tournament? Or whether the tournament was a
profit-making venture, or perhaps as part of a charity event? Without
knowing, ex ante, the extent of the license, the license is of little help to
consumers. A second problem with implying a license for matching ap-
plications is that the game publisher can only grant a license to material
for which it controls the rights. The game publisher does not own the
rights to the music contained within the game, and therefore can only
grant a license to the extent permitted by the license between the pub-
lisher and the owner. The license that allows the game publisher to use
the musical composition in the video game is a synchronization license,
the same license issued by the owner of a musical composition to a film
producer who wants to include that music in a film. In the film context,
synchronization licenses typically do not allow the song to be played as
part of the film on television absent a blanket license that would cover
the playing of the song independently."" Therefore, it is likely that the
synchronization license between the game publisher and the owner of
the musical composition only goes as far as necessary to enable the play-
ing of the video game in a private setting. Thus, the game publisher
would be unable to grant a license, implied or otherwise, to the pur-
chaser of the video game to conduct any tournament that might be
considered a public performance.
2. Estoppel
The reasoning for the defense of estoppel in the Internet context
closely tracks that of implied license. As with implied license, Field pro-
vides a good case study in how the defense works."7 In Field, the court
determined that Field was estopped from asserting a copyright claim be-
cause (1) Field knew that Google would create cached copies of his
content; (2) Field chose not to use standard industry protocols to prevent
Google from caching his content; (3) Google was ignorant of Field's
desire not to have his content cached; and (4) Google detrimentally re-
lied on Field's silence regarding his desire not to have his content
116. See 6 NIMMER & NiMMER, supra note 14, § 30.04, form 30.04Cl(l)(ll)(a) (ex-
plaining that a form synchronization license does not allow a film producer to authorize
"television exhibitors" to perform a song, even as part of showing the film). It is possible, if
not for the consent decrees between ASCAP, BMI and the U.S. government, that a separate
license might even be required of movie theaters to publicly perform the song as part of exhib-
iting the film. See id. at n.91.
117. Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1116 (D. Nev. 2006).
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cached."' Rather than focusing on Google's actions, the court focused on
Field's failure to use standard industry protocols to prevent the caching.
This reasoning shows that the outcome in the case was driven by the fact
that Field posted his works for public consumption on the Internet and,
in doing so, relinquished a substantial amount of control over further
copying.
The defense of estoppel becomes more problematic in the MRIA
context. As discussed above, publishing books, music, and art does not
have the same implications as posting content on the Web. While there
are specific protocols that instruct web crawlers on what they can and
cannot do, there is no similar way of notifying users that they are not to
use MRIAs to capture and transmit certain audio or images from the
physical world. In addition, even if such protocols were available, it
would be difficult or impossible to ensure the services' many users fol-
lowed them. In the context of a web crawler, a court can be fairly
confident that Google's code obeys the industry protocols in determining
whether to cache content, and if not, the code can be examined and test-
ed. Users, on the other hand, are much more difficult to control. For
example, it is unlikely that Midomi's terms of use, which require the us-
er to have appropriate licenses before uploading performed songs,
prevent any improper copying."9
3. Fair Use
Fair use is an affirmative defense that recognizes condemning certain
behaviors as copyright infringement can stifle the purpose of copyright
to promote progress of the arts and sciences.120 Applying copyright law
too rigidly-for instance, by forbidding part of a work to be reproduced
for uses such as criticism or teaching-would diminish the value of the
created works to the public. The doctrine requires courts to take account
of at least four factors in determining whether a use was non-infringing:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the
amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
118. Id.atll6-17.
119. Terms of Use, MIDoMI, http://www.midomi.com/index.php?action=main.terms
of_use (last visited Nov. 12, 2010) ("You shall be solely responsible for your own User Sub-
missions and the consequences of posting or publishing them. In connection with User
Submissions, you affirm, represent, and/or warrant that: (i) you own, or have the necessary
licenses, rights, consents, and permissions to use .... ").
120. See PATRY, supra note 2, § 1:2 ("Fair use is an important safety valve that acts as a
bulwark against the monopoly power that inheres in an exclusive right and which leads owners
of such rights to act in ways contrary to the public interest.").
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copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.121
The fair use doctrine has been attacked from all directions. While there
is a popular notion of what constitutes fair use, the actual doctrine likely
under-serves that notion. For example, Professor Jessica Litman has
pointed out that while fair use may cover some of what she calls "per-
sonal use," it leaves uncovered a large amount of common activity that
most would agree should be legal.122 Others have attacked fair use as hav-
ing grown far beyond the original intentions of the doctrine.123 Professor
William Henslee has argued that several decisions of the Supreme Court,
including Sony, have improperly expanded the fair use defense, and he
has suggested that Congress enact a statute that severely limits the scope
of fair use as it relates to musical compositions and sound recordings.124
Whatever the proper scope of the doctrine, the ambiguity of fair use pro-
vides little protection for consumers, who are unable to know, ex ante,
whether they are infringing a copyright.'
Along with the other defenses previously discussed, Google's behav-
ior in Field was also found to be fair use.'26 Reviewing the fair use
factors, the court found that the first fair use factor, the purpose and
character of the use, weighed in Google's favor, because caching served
a different purpose than the original works.127 Specifically, caching al-
lowed access to information that might be unavailable because either the
original site was down or the content had been changed.128 In addition,
because Google had more control over the cached pages, it could high-
light the terms for which the user had searched. 2 9 It is fair to criticize
each of these "transformative" purposes. First, allowing a user to access
121. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
122. Litman, supra note 13, at 1898 (examples include drawing pictures to resemble
images in comic books, forwarding email messages, and playing music in one's house loud
enough that passers-by can hear it if the windows are open).
123. William Henslee, You Can't Always Get What You Want, But If You Try Sometimes
You Can Steal It and Call It Fair Use: A Proposal to Abolish the Fair Use Defense for Music,
58 CATH. U. L. REV. 663, 665 (2009).
124. Id. at 700.
125. See Litman, supra note 13, at 1902-03 ("Fair use in its current form is notoriously
fact specific, requiring a hideously expensive trial on the merits to determine. If a person seek-
ing to determine whether a given personal use is lawful needs to go to court, each time, to find
out, then the tool is of almost no practical assistance."); Tehranian, supra note 13, at 543
("Fair use is, after all, notoriously fickle and the defense offers little ex ante refuge to users of
copyrighted works."). Some scholars have, however, argued that fair use is a flexible doctrine
that balances the interests of creators and consumers. E.g., Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling
Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 2537, 2540 (2009).
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content that has been changed or taken down completely seems to limit
the author's ability to control the distribution of her own work. Just be-
cause an author gives away her work for free today does not mean that
she desires to give it away for free tomorrow. The highlighting of search
terms is transformative but could also be seen as the creation of a deriva-
tive work, making the behavior less protected-i.e., more likely to be
infringement. Further, this feature could be accomplished without cach-
ing the original content.130
Regarding the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted works, the
court found that because Field had placed the works on the Web and there-
fore made them available for the world to see, the fact that they were
creative weighed less in Field's favor that it would have otherwise.'
While the entire works were cached, their free availability on the Web also
meant that the amount of substantiality of the use did not weigh heavily
against a finding of fair use.132 Finally, because there was no evidence of a
market for Field's stories, especially since they were freely available, the
court found that regarding the fourth factor, the effect of the use upon po-
tential market, there was no market to be harmed."' The court then went
beyond the four statutory factors and found that Google's good faith in
operating its cache-i.e., obeying the industry standard protocols for a
website owners requests not to cache their content-was an additional
factor that weighed in favor of fair use.134
While Field shows how fair use can be applied to protect much In-
ternet activity, Religious Technology Center v. Lerma provides a good
example of what type of activity will not be considered fair use.'3 ' Ler-
ma, a critic of the Church of Scientology, posted to the Internet materials
in which Religious Technology Center (RTC) owned the copyright. 6
These works had not been published by RTC but had been widely dis-
seminated as part of a public court file relating to a different case.'1 RTC
sued Lerma for copyright infringement.' Evaluating the fair use factors,
130. Google Toolbar-Features, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/toolbar/ie/features.htmi
#highlight (last visited Apr. 29, 2010).
131. Field, 412 F. Supp. 2d at 1120.
132. Id. at I120-21.
133. Id. at 1121.
134. Id. at 1122. To some degree, Field's application of fair use might be viewed as tak-
ing the standard "first sale" doctrine and transforming it into an extremely broad "first view"
doctrine applicable to the Internet. Because the original copy was legally obtained by Google
during the indexing process, it has the ability to distribute that work, the author's desire not-
withstanding. See 2 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 14, § 8.12(E).
135. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, CIV.A. No. 95-1107-A, 1996 WL 633131 (E.D. Va.
Oct. 4, 1996).
136. Id. at *2.
137. Id. at *7.
138. Id. at *4.
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the court found that the arguments that the purpose of Lerma's copying
was for criticism and research were not especially persuasive, particu-
larly considering the substantial amount of the work that was copied.
In other words, even though the use was non-commercial, the substanti-
ality of the copying argued against the use being transformative. This
indicates that courts may be less willing to consider fair use arguments,
even for non-commercial uses, when there has been substantial copying.
The Lerma court also found that the unpublished nature of the works
required a narrower scope of fair use.140 The court noted a somewhat au-
thor-subjective view of publication in finding the works had not been
published.14' The court also noted that even widely disseminated works
cannot be considered published for fair use purposes unless "the author
has given 'implied consent' through such action as performance or dis-
semination" 42 This view of publication may have consequences for
evaluating fair use of MRIAs. While Field's posting on the Internet
weighed against him in his case against Google, the Lerna court was
much more willing to investigate the copyright owner's intentions when
the content came from the physical world. Like the previous defenses,
copying content from the physical world seems to reduce the effective-
ness of the fair use defense in the MRIA context.
Regarding the "amount and substantiality" of the copying, the court
attempted but failed to determine whether the amount of the work copied
was qualitatively substantial ("essentially the heart of") the work.143 The
court, therefore, relied on the quantitative analysis: Lerma had copied so
much that it did not matter whether it was the "heart" or not.'"
Field and Lerma illustrate that, whatever the proper scope of fair
use, the current doctrine turns on extremely fact-specific determinations.
Professor Litman has noted that the current, multifactor fair use test is
unwieldy and of little use to consumers for whom the defense is most
important.14 5 In addition, the approaches taken in the two cases show that
the source of the copy may affect the determination of fair use. In Field,
the author had made the content available for free on the Internet. The
source of the copy made using an MRIA-the physical world-may
make it more analogous to the content in Lerma, where the copyright
139. Id. at *5.
140. Id. at *7.
141. Id.
142. Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 551 (1985)).
143. Id. at *9.
144. Id.
145. Litman, supra note 13, at 1902-03; see also Tehranian, supra note 13, at 543 ("Fair
use is, after all, notoriously fickle and the defense offers little ex ante refuge to users of copy-
righted works.").
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owner had not made an effort to widely disseminate the content by plac-
ing it on the Internet.
Applying the fair use factors to our MRIA examples, simple search-
ing would likely qualify as fair use. Using a search service serves a
different purpose than that served by the original work. The purpose of
an original musical work is to listen to the song, while, for example, the
purpose of Shazam is to learn more about the song. Shazam requires on-
ly a short snippet of a song to identify it, and that snippet can be any
portion of the song, not necessarily the "heart" of the work. But the fact-
specific nature of the fair use analysis means that the determination
could turn on small details. For example, it would weigh more against a
finding of fair use if a user transmitted the "heart" of a song, since it
might be considered more substantive than some less recognizable seg-
ment. Similarly, under the quantitative analysis employed in Lerma, use
of a music search application that required transmission of a whole song
rather than a snippet would also weigh against a finding of fair use.
While the "nature" of a popular song as an item of commerce may weigh
against fair use, this would likely be countered by the fact that there
would be no harm to the market for the song. The use of Shazam may, in
fact, help the market as a new channel of commerce to purchase the
song.
Stocking applications may be more likely to fall outside of fair use.
For example, Midomi requests that users transmit full versions of copy-
righted songs to the service. This highlights two different purposes a user
may have in stocking applications such as Midomi. First, a user may
stock Midomi in order to help build Midomi's index. This would seem to
be a transformative use: it allows people to find the original song more
easily. Second, a user may stock Midomi in an effort to secure fame and
glory as a "Midomi Star." 4 6 This does not seem to be a transformative
use as it serves the same purpose as the original song: it allows people to
listen to the song, albeit an unlicensed performance of it. Therefore, the
dual purposes of stocking point in opposite directions regarding fair use.
Of course, it is extremely difficult to determine which purpose the user
had when he originally recorded the song. While it may be possible to
stock an audio service with a hummed or sung snippet, many users may
perform the entire song, and therefore the amount of copying also
weighs against fair use. Lastly, the market may be affected if this behav-
ior proliferates and consumers begin listening to these unlicensed,
uncompensated performances of the musical compositions.
146. Midomi Stars, MiDOMI, http://www.midomi.com/index.php?action=main.charts
&f rom=topnav (last visited Nov. 18, 2010).
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While audio search services seem to benefit the market for a work,
some MRIAs could harm the market by offering substitutes. For exam-
ple, when a user searches for a song in Midomi, he finds not only the
recording by the original artist but also all of the versions that have been
recorded by Midomi users. As these can be played for free, some users
may choose to forgo purchasing the original track. A mash-up of an au-
dio search service with a music suggestion service, such as Pandora or
iTunes Genius, could have a similarly negative effect on the market for
the searched-for song, since they suggest to users other, possibly less
expensive, songs in which users might be interested. An error-prone al-
gorithm might even harm the market for a work if it directed users to
purchase a song other than the one sought.
The treatment of the market harm factor also has the effect of work-
ing against users interacting with MRIAs. The market harm factor is
analyzed based not on the individual use but on a consideration of
whether the market would be harmed if the use proliferated. 14 While ag-
gregate behavior would seem to be an appropriate analysis of the service
provider's liability, that indirect liability can only exist if there was direct
infringement. Where aggregate behavior appears to harm copyright own-
ers but individual behavior appears lawful, copyright owners might argue
against the users' behavior being fair use; otherwise, the application of
fair use to individual behavior would defeat any claim against the service
provider for the aggregate behavior. Such situations might arise in the
context of MRIAs. Consider, for instance, my hypothetical search-
suggestion mash-up application that directs users to substitutes for the
transmitted clip. Each transmission of a short snippet of a song would
seem to fall into the realm of conduct that should be protected. Evaluated
on its own, such behavior by the user would appear to be something that
should be protected by fair use, and it would seem improper to hold the
user liable for using the application. Looking at the aggregate of the be-
havior might tell a different story. The service provider profits from
selling the substitute songs and harms the market for the original song in
the process.
4. DMCA Safe Harbor
The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) of 1998 was Con-
gress's attempt to build a legislative foundation for the growth of the
147. See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 2, § 6:10 ("Although insubstantial uses by themselves
are insufficient to tip the fourth factor in the copyright owner's favor, if the use is of a type
which, if widespread, would result in substantial harm, this fact should be taken into ac-
count.").
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Internet.148 Congress recognized that it had to balance the concerns of
copyright owners about online infringement with the concerns of service
providers about incurring liability.14 9 The compromise Congress struck
created exemptions from liability for copyright infringement for com-
mon activities carried out by service providers.o Section 512 of the
DMCA enumerates these "safe harbors."' 5 ' These include protection for
"[t]ransitory [d]igital [n]etwork [c]ommunications" where the copying is
passive and done to facilitate the transportation of the information across
the Internet.152 Another safe harbor, successfully raised as a defense in
Field, is for "[s]ystem [c]aching."5 ' A third important safe harbor is that
for storing "[i]nformation . . . [a]t [the] [d]irection of [u]sers."54 This
safe harbor exempts service providers from liability for user-posted con-
tent as long as they properly police the site by taking down infringing
material, including upon the request of the copyright owner.' ' It is im-
portant to note that this safe harbor protects the service providers from
direct liability but does not protect them from liability for vicarious in-
fringement.
Unlike the other affirmative defenses, the safe harbors are not meant
to nullify infringement but only to take service providers off the list of
defendants. Before a defendant can invoke any of the DMCA's safe har-
bors, it must first show that it is a service provider. Accordingly, the
DMCA's safe harbors provide no protection for users of MRIAs. Even if
the user is acting in ways analogous to those protected for service pro-
viders, the user receives no protection-compare a user transmitting a
requested song by singing into Midomi to that of YouTube transmitting a
148. See, e.g., Mike Scott, Safe Harbors Under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 9
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. Po' Y 99,99-100 (2006).
149. E.g., id.
150. E.g., id.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2006).
152. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
153. 17 U.S.C. § 512(b). A recent article, however, challenges this view of the "system
caching" safe harbor, arguing that the caching envisioned by the DMCA is of a more technical
nature, and does not cover the type of caching in which Google engages. Peguera, supra note
16, at 620-23 (arguing that the "system cache" safe harbor is meant to protect "proxy cach-
ing" and not the type of caching in which Google was engaged).
154. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c).
155. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C).
156. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(B) (stating there is no safe harbor if a service provider re-
ceives a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity, if "the service provider
has the right and ability to control such activity"); see also Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing
Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH L. 101, 104 n.23, 114 n.53 (2007) (not-
ing that the language of § 512 suggests that it does not provide a safe harbor from vicarious
liability but that the legislative history suggests the opposite). But see Edward Lee, Decoding
the DMCA Safe Harbors, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 233, 240-454 (2009) (arguing that the
DMCA provides for immunity from claims of vicarious and contributory infringement).
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requested video to a user. While there are obvious differences-the serv-
ers at YouTube are not the humans singing to Midomi-this does not
necessarily justify the policy decision to protect service providers, but
not users. While computers are in a sense "dumber" than humans, the
service providers running them may be more sophisticated actors than
the users of MRIAs. Although the user watching a YouTube clip may
have a better sense of whether the content is copyrighted than the server
transmitting it, the company running Midomi may have a better under-
standing of whether it is asking a user to engage in copyright
infringement when it asks the user to sing a song it knows is copy-
righted.'
III. PROMOTING INNOVATION REQUIRES CONSIDERING USERS
This Essay has shown that even seemingly innocuous user interac-
tions with MRIAs can constitute copyright infringement and that the
defenses that are used to justify the legality of legacy web behavior are
unsuited to protecting users making copies of real world content. This
Part discusses the status quo's potential harm to innovation. It then pro-
poses a solution to address this harm that also preserves copyright
owners' ability to protect themselves from harmful uses of their works.
A. The Potential Harm
An obvious response to the possible infringement through use of
MRIAs is that these are technical infringements with which the content
owners do not appear to be concerned, and so neither should we. These
behaviors would likely fall into the high-volume, low-value infringement
that Professor Tim Wu indentifies as "tolerated use."" Professor Wu ar-
gues that such use is not of concern because copyright owners will
distinguish between beneficial and detrimental uses and only bring in-
fringement suits against the detrimental uses. 5 9 Searching MRIA
behavior, which provides users with the ability to purchase content, may
even benefit copyright owners.
157. Even if the user is aware that the song being sung is copyrighted, she may not be
aware that her transfer of a copy of her rendition of the song over the Internet would constitute
infringement.
158. Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 628, 630-34 (2008) (arguing
that there is a category of high-volume, low-value infringement that is tolerated by the copy-
right owners and that needed reform may be in those owners making clear what they will
tolerate and what they will not tolerate).
159. Id. at 628 (stating that copyright owners "tolerat[e] most infringement, and en-
forc[e] only as against the costly varieties").
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Even absent actual enforcement, the threat of enforcement along
with the uncertainty in the law chills innovation. Professor Lawrence
Lessig has noted this effect with regard to service providers." The un-
certainty related to user liability for using MRIAs can also chill
innovation. As Professor Litman has noted, the progress of arts and sci-
ences requires not just that works are created but that they are
consumed.'6 ' Personal use is important because it actually promotes the
consumption of copyrighted works.162 Similarly, without users to take
advantage of them, service providers would not invest in development of
innovative new applications. Service providers may also shy away from
development of innovative MRIAs if they are concerned that such appli-
cations might expose them to indirect liability. While some developers
are sophisticated parties who will seek out legal advice about what does
and does not constitute infringement, many developers of smartphone
applications are individuals who cannot or do not make such significant
investment. In this way, the division between service provider and user
is becoming smaller, and the odds that a service provider lacks legal ad-
vice are increasing.
In response to the concern that the threat of enforcement may deter
beneficial use, Professor Wu makes two suggestions. First, he suggests a
shift in the law that would give better treatment to beneficial or comple-
mentary uses." Second, he suggests that copyright owners provide a "no
action policy" indicating which uses will be tolerated and which will
not.'16 While both are valuable suggestions, neither is especially useful in
the MRIA context. He bases his suggestion on shifting the law both on
fair use grounds and on the idea that complementary uses-such as fan
sites that provide beneficial marketing for the original works-should
160. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: THE NATURE AND FUTURE OF CREATIVITY
193-94(2005).
161. Litman, supra note 13, at 1882 ("[Clopyright law encourages authorship at least as
much for the benefit of the people who will read, view, listen to, and experience the works that
authors create, as for the advantage of those authors and their distributors.").
162. Id. at 1908 ("Personal uses, though, occupy the heart of copyright's historic liber-
ties to enjoy copyrighted works.").
163. See Ben Lorica, The Most Efficient iPhone Developers, O'REILLY RADAR (Feb. 11,
2010), http://radar.oreilly.com/2010/02/efficient-iphone-developers.html (noting there are
almost 31,000 different developers who have developed apps for the iTunes store and that
"[t]here are quite a few individual developers who've produced top-grossing apps"); iOS De-
veloper Program, APPLE, http://developer.apple.com/programs/ios/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2010)
(listing the cost of enrolling in Apple's developer program that includes the needed tools for
writing iPhone apps at ninety-nine dollars per year).
164. Wu, supra note 158, at 630-33.
165. Id. at 633-34 ("In legal terms, the copyright no action policy is a unilateral, non-
exclusive, potentially revocable license from the media owner to all members of the general
public who meet its terms. The No Action Policy could be specific to a given work, or could
be a blanket policy for all works owned by a given media firm.").
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not be considered derivative works. The problems with relying on fair
use to protect users of MRIAs are discussed above.'" The idea that com-
plementary uses should not be considered derivative works does not
really apply to most MRIA behavior. For instance, determining in-
fringement of reproduction and performance rights does not require a
consideration of how transformative the use is.' 6 Professor Wu's sugges-
tion about providing notice of a "no action policy" also provides little
value in the context of MRIA behaviors. Such a policy is only valuable if
the user knows who owns the content. Even if a user took the time to
check a website for such a policy before each use of an audio search ap-
plication, she would need to know which website to visit. If she knew
where to look-and therefore knew who owned the song to which she
was listening-there would be less need to search for the audio in the
first place.
Even if most MRIA behavior fell into the category of tolerated use
and the threat of enforcement did not deter users, there are still reasons
for being concerned that use of MRIAs might violate copyright law.
First, as Professor Lessig has pointed out, allowing copyright law to offi-
cially condemn behavior in which many people are engaged "corrupts
citizens and weakens the rule of law."6 Professor Lemley has also noted
that the "cognitive dissonance between copyright law and the real world
is troubling," not only because it may affect the respect for the rule of
law in general but also because "it may lead those who violate the unen-
forced parts of the copyright laws with impunity to assume that they can
violate the copyright law in other ways as well." 69 To the extent that us-
ers violate copyright law by using MRIAs, this represents a new wedge
separating copyright law from copyright norms.
Second, the fact that at least some MRIA behaviors would not seem
to harm-and may even benefit-copyright owners, does not mean that
there will never be an infringement suit brought against a user. The con-
tent industry has historically attempted to exert as much control over
works as possible." 0 For example, Universal Music Group (UMG) sued
MP3.com for copyright infringement, '' forcing MP3.com to shut
166. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
167. See discussion supra Part II.A.1-2.
168. LESSIG, supra note 160, at 199.
169. Lemley, supra note 54, at 578.
170. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson & Jason Schultz, Should Copyright Owners Have to
Give Notice of Their Use of Technical Protection Measures?, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH
TECH. L. 41, 42 (2007) (discussing how the content industry has employed technical protec-
tion measures that obstruct both legitimate and illegitimate access and uses of content).
171. UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92 F Supp. 2d 349 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
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down.1 2 The infringing service allowed users to listen to music from le-
gally owned CDs without the need to have the actual CD on hand.
UMG's parent company, Vivendi,174 eventually purchased and incorpo-
rated the service of MP3.com into Vivendi's subscription service,
possibly a suggestion that the concern was not necessarily with the ser-
vice itself but with who controlled the service.7 1
Similarly, to the extent that there is revenue to be generated when
search applications lead consumers to content, the content industry
might feel that such revenue should go to them and not a third party. Pro-
fessor Sonia Katyal has described a shift in the strategy of the music
industry's copyright enforcement from litigation against consumers to
more passive forms of surveillance and monitoring.17 By allowing the
identification of locations that are playing music without the proper li-
cense, an industry-controlled audio search application could be an
important monitoring tool in this new approach. 7 ' At the same time that
a bar patron is learning more about a song being played in a bar, the in-
dustry can match the location of the sending phone to its licensee
database, generating a license agreement or cease-and-desist letter to the
bar if it is not a current licensee.'
Further, the idiosyncratic interests of individual artists may lead to
claims against users for behaviors involving specific works.'"9 The statu-
tory damages resulting from copyright infringement provide a strong
incentive for copyright owners to bring claims against whomever might
be able to pay or is willing to settle. "
172. E.g., Jessica Litman, War Stories, 20 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 337, 346-47
(2002).
173. E.g., id.
174. VIVENDI, http://www.vivendi.comlvivendilUniversal-EN (last visited Oct. 27,
2010).
175. Id.
176. Sonia K. Katyal, Filtering, Piracy Surveillance and Disobedience, 32 COLUM. J.L.
& ARTS 401, 402-03 (2009).
177. Such a tool would appear to match Professor Katyal's definition of piracy surveil-
lance in that it: "(1) [is] performed by private, non-government entities; (2) encompass[es]
extrajudicial determinations of copyright infringement; and (3) [is] extralegal in nature; that is,
surveillance that takes place entirely outside of ongoing litigation." Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy
vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 292 (2004-05).
178. See Tehranian, supra note 13, at 550 (discussing how the advance in surveillance
technology increases the "detection and enforcement power of copyright holders").
179. See Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152 (N.D. Cal. 2008)
(noting that a takedown notice sent to YouTube might have been driven by Prince's mission of
"reclaim[ing] his art on the intemet").
180. See, e.g., Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118 (D. Nev. 2006); see also
Tehranian, supra note 13, at 548 (discussing how the "long tail" has made copyright enforce-
ment "increasingly worthwhile for a growing number of copyright holders"). This use of the
term "long tail" refers to the fact that new technology has made it easier to connect people
with very specific interests and has therefore made it economically viable to create content for
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The need to consider users is illustrated by Lenz v. Universal Music
Corp."' The plaintiff in Lenz posted a YouTube video of a toddler danc-
ing with twenty seconds of Prince's "Let's Go Crazy" audible in the
background.182 Universal Music, the owner of the copyright, issued a
takedown notice under § 512 to YouTube, notifying it that Universal had
a good faith belief that the clip violated their copyright. YouTube com-
plied with the notice and removed the clip from its site, which is a
necessary step to stay within the safe harbor for user-posted content. Al-
though the court ultimately held that the good faith standard of issuing a
takedown notice required Universal to consider whether the posting was
fair use," the background of this case shows that striking a balance be-
tween service providers and copyright owners can ignore important
interests of users. In this case, Prince desired total control over the use of
his work, a goal Universal was willing to help him pursue in order to
maintain a good relationship with him.'" As a service provider, YouTube
had no choice but to strictly follow the takedown requirements if it
wanted to stay within the safe harbor. This meant that the interest of
Lenz in posting a video that contained a fair use copy of Prince's mate-
rial was lost in the shuffle. While Lenz did win this case, showing that
some courts may be willing to consider the interests of users, the result
does not provide much comfort for users in the future. The hurdle of
"good faith" is easily overcome by a copyright owner in issuing a take-
down notice, especially given the ambiguity of the fair use doctrine.
Furthermore, if Lenz had known ahead of time what she would go
through to vindicate her rights, she may not have posted the clip in the
first place.
Thus, while the DMCA has put in place a regime that allows service
providers to protect themselves from public liability, it has not provided
a way for users to similarly shield themselves from liability. Section 512
provides a notice-and-takedown procedure that allows copyright owners
to notify service providers of infringing content and request that such
content be removed.5 Service providers must follow the notice-and-
such niche interests. See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS
IS SELLING LESS OF MORE 15-26 (2006).
181. Lenz, 572 F. Supp.2d 1150.
182. Id. at il51.
183. Id.atl155.
184. The takedown notice seems to leverage the rights provided by the DMCA in an
attempt to gain control over what are known as "moral rights" that have only limited protec-
tion for visual works in the United States. It is also somewhat analogous to "dilution" in the
trademark context. While no one would consider the video a Prince-authorized work, Prince
likely had a desire not to have the song associated with dancing toddlers, as opposed to his
rock-and-roll persona.
185. 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)(C) (2006) (stating that the exception to liability for monetary
relief for a service provider requires the service provider to "upon notification of claimed
Media Rich Input Application Liability
takedown procedure to stay within the DMCA's safe harbor for hosting
user-uploaded content."' As a result, innovation is protected in two ways.
Most obviously, it allows service providers to create services that host
user-uploaded content without fear of liability. Additionally, because a
takedown notice sent by a copyright owner is the primary way a service
provider discovers infringement, a copyright owner who tolerates an in-
fringing use because it is beneficial to him can choose to refrain from
sending a notice, thereby allowing innovative services to thrive.17 On the
other hand, users remain threatened with liability for copyright in-
fringement for engaging in the same acts for which the service provider
is protected. This uncertainty threatens innovation, because the viability
of MRIAs relies heavily on users' willingness to copy and transmit copy-
righted material.
B. A Potential Solution
The DMCA represented Congress's attempt to protect innovation on
the Internet by creating safe harbors for service providers engaged in
routine activities. By not taking into consideration the role of users, the
DMCA may not protect innovation as fully as intended. While fair use
would be the most likely candidate for protecting users, it does little
more than help clarify the extremes. Therefore, continued innovation on
the Internet requires not just safe harbors for service providers but also
safe harbors for users.
To allow MRIAs and other innovative applications to flourish, users
must be given the same respect and protection given to service providers.
Like the safe harbors of § 512, this does not require full immunity for all
user actions. Instead, it requires protection from liability for routine be-
havior essential to continued innovation. In other words, it needs to filter
out innocent acts from acts where liability is appropriate. Because the
safe harbor is meant to protect users from routine behavior, it should be
both simple and accord with the public's current beliefs about copyright
law.'18 In the context of MRIAs, an appropriate threshold for separating
out innocent uses is the finding of harm. This is similar to making a
infringement .. . respond[] expeditiously to remove, or disable access to, the material that is
claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of infringing activity").
186. Id.
187. See Wu, supra note 158, at 619 (positing that one reason a copyright owner might
tolerate use is "a calculation that the infringement creates an economic complement to the
copyrighted work-it actually benefits the owner").
188. See generally Litman, supra note 57.
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determination, ex ante, of what a copyright owner would likely consider
a tolerated use. *
Further, a valid solution should protect users but not necessarily nul-
lify possible infringement. In other words, a user safe harbor should
appropriately shift the liability to the MRIA service provider when there
has been injury to copyright owners, even if the user should not be liable
for the injury. This recognizes that while each user transmission to an
MRIA might do little harm to the copyright owner, there may be situa-
tions where there is still aggregate harm for which the copyright owner
should be able to recover.
Another concern is that it may be difficult to find the dividing line
between MRIA and legacy applications that have already been con-
demned as infringing. The purpose of this safe harbor is to protect
innovation, not to reignite battles over the legality of uploading to P2P
programs such as Grokster. One way to help distinguish these two types
of applications is to focus on what Professor Matthew Sag terms "non-
expressive use.""J' Nonexpressive use is use that does not communicate
the author's original expression to the public. 92 Establishing a safe har-
bor based on nonexpressive use could help protect MRIA behavior,
while not protecting infringement by uploading protected works to P2P
applications.
A focus on nonexpressive use would also distinguish between web-
based searching and stocking applications, on the one hand, and match-
ing technologies, on the other. The user safe harbor is, perhaps, less
appropriate for use of matching applications. Expressing Lennon and
McCartney's original work through a public performance of The Beatles:
Rock Band would seem to create a loophole in the established law re-
garding public performances.193 The user safe harbor is also less
important for matching video games because the purchase of the video
game creates a contractual nexus. This allows both a defense of implied
license and, perhaps more usefully, the ability for a video game pub-
lisher to create an explicit license clarifying the extent of lawful uses of
the game.
To balance the protection of users with the legitimate interests of
copyright owners, I propose the following safe harbor:
189. See Wu, supra note 158, at 617 (stating that "casual and often harmless uses of
works comprise the category of tolerated use").
190. Professor Wu details two examples of such high-volume, low-value situations. Id. at
627-28.
191. Matthew Sag, Copyright and Copy-Reliant Technology, 103 Nw. U. L. REV. 1607,
1624 (2009).
192. Id. at 1624 ("Copyright protects only works that contain original creative expres-
sion.").
193. See supra Part II.A.2.
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A user of a service provider's service shall not be liable for stat-
utory damages under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) for transmitting
material, including performances of that material, to that service
provider where the purpose in transmitting is not to communi-
cate the author's original expression to the public. Nothing in
this section shall be construed to limit a copyright owner's abil-
ity to recover damages, statutory or otherwise, from a service
provider.
This user safe harbor statute addresses the considerations above. First,
by eliminating statutory damages, it places the burden on the copyright
owner to show: (1) actual damages or (2) profits by the user.19 4 Users are
therefore liable for behavior that inflicts harm on the copyright owner or
generates profit for themselves, but not for behavior that does neither.
Second, by requiring that the transmission be for a purpose other than
communicating the author's original expression to the public, the statute
would not expand protection to other, previously condemned acts, such
as P2P file sharing. Together, these aspects would allow courts to sepa-
rate users who engage in similar activities with different purposes or
different results. In other words, users who stock a service with popular
cover versions of copyrighted songs, become famous, and begin compet-
ing with the artists they are covering might have to pay damages.'9 '.Users
whose contributions to the service simply increase the effectiveness of
the sound matching, with no intention of financial gain, would not be
required to pay any damages.
The statute would also allow copyright owners to continue to bring
claims against service providers for indirect liability for aggregate be-
haviors. This recognizes that the actions of a service provider can
sometimes go beyond inducement to a form of entrapment in which an
individual uses an MRIA in good faith, trusting that the service provider
would not distribute an application whose standard use constitutes copy-
right infringement. This approach matches the approach taken by the
DMCA safe harbor in protecting service providers: it punishes the party
at fault while protecting innocent parties.
In addition, placing the liability for aggregate action on the service
provider shifts the burden of preventing infringement to the service pro-
vider, who is the lowest-cost avoider.96 The user of an audio search
194. 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (2006) ("The copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual
damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement, and any profits of the infringer
that are attributable to the infringement and are not taken into account in computing the actual
damages.").
195. This would also apply to services that pay users to stock their indexes.
196. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Pmnise of Internet Intermediary Li-
ability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REv. 239, 265-75 (2005) (proposing a framework for
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application has little, if any, knowledge about the transmitted clip. The
service provider, on the other hand, has the ability to tailor the service by
excluding results related to works for which the copyright owner has
requested such exclusion.
One potential criticism of this approach is that, unlike the DMCA's
safe harbor, it does not provide for a private enforcement mechanism.' 97
In the context of a user safe harbor, however, such a private enforcement
mechanism is not necessary for two reasons. First, the proposed statute
does not remove all liability for monetary damages from the user. The
user is only protected from liability for statutory damages. The public
enforcement option remains open to copyright owners who find they
have suffered actual harm from the user's actions. Just as the notice-and-
takedown mechanism of § 512 helps to separate incidental infringing
acts of service providers from willful ones, the requirement of actual
harm to receive monetary damages helps separate incidental infringing
acts of users from those acts based on malice or financial gain. Second,
by not foreclosing claims against service providers for indirect liability,
the burden is placed on the service provider to avoid infringement by
users and to do any necessary monitoring.
CONCLUSION
Like the evolution of Web 2.0 over the past decade,'" smartphone
applications represent the current area of extreme innovation, and
MRIAs are some of the most innovative of these new applications.
However, like many innovative uses of communication technology, there
policymakers to use to determine who is the least-cost avoider in the context of Internet-
related misconduct).
197. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (c)(1)(C); supra notes 185-186 and accompanying text; see
also Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First Amend-
ment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1003 (2008).
198. Tim O'Reilly & John Battelle, Web Squared: Web 2.0 Five Years On, WEB 2.0
SUMMIT, http://www.web2summit.com/web2009/public/schedule/detail/10194 (last visited
Apr. 28, 2010).
199. According to Apple, its AppStore has over 225,000 applications available for the
iPhone, iPod Touch, and iPad. Applelnsider Staff, Apple Says App Store Has Made Developers
Over $1 Billion, APPLEINSIDER (June 7, 2010, 1:10 PM), http://www.appleinsider.com/
articles/I 0/06/07/apple-says..app-storehas made developers overjIbillion.html. Accord-
ing to Google, its Android Market has over 80,000 applications available. Introducing the T-
Mobile G2 with Google, T-MOBILE (Sept. 9, 2010), http://press.t-mobile.com/articles/t-
mobile-g-with-google. In addition to users, copyright owners have started to take an interest in
these technologies. See, e.g., Soundcheck: Sing a Song with Me, WNYC (Mar. 15, 2007),
http://www.wnyc.org/shows/soundcheck/2007/mar/15/sing-a-song-with-mel at 4:03 ("Record
labels are contacting [Midomi] to try to get in touch with some of [Midomi's] performers
because these performers are getting thousands and thousands of impressions . .. ).
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is a question as to what degree the use of these applications conflicts
with copyright law.2 00 If there is a conflict, what potential harm is created
by the conflict? Finally, to the extent there is harm, does it need to be
alleviated by either the use or the law giving way? 21' As shown in this
Essay, MRIAs have the potential to open users to liability for copyright
infringement. While copyright law has evolved to protect service provid-
ers in the interest of developing the Internet, it has left users behind.
Even though much MRIA use may be tolerated by copyright owners,
the uncertainty of potential liability can still lead to harms, especially to
202innovation. This is especially true for the most innovative applications,
over which there may be legitimate business reasons to maintain con-
trol.203 The threat of liability is compounded with the introduction of
artists whose idiosyncratic interests may control.2 04
If users are uncomfortable with using new services, service provid-
ers have no incentive to innovate. Therefore, providing protection to
service providers, without similar protection to users, will cause innova-
tion to suffer. To support continued development of innovative
technologies, Congress should give users a safe harbor.
200. See Tehranian, supra note 13, at 537 (noting the temptation to cite the Internet as
"disrupting ... the delicate balance struck by pre-digital copyright laws between the rights of
owners and users of creative works").
201. See id. at 548 (noting that new technology is forcing the recognition of the "vast
disparity between what activities the Copyright Act proscribes and what the average American
might consider fair or just . . ."); see also Wu, supra note 158.
202. See Wu, supra note 158, at 628 (acknowledging that even if use is tolerated, "the
trick is to enforce [not tolerated uses] without deterring complementary user of the underlying
work .. ."). Professor Wu's view of tolerated use, including the difficulty in applying his pro-
posals to MRIAs, is discussed above. See supra Part 111.1.
203. See Grimmelmann, supra note 2, at 17 tbl.1 (stating that content providers have an
interest in indexing that might be protected by the legal theories of trespass and contract); see
also Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 731 (9th Cir. 2007) (referring to
copyright owner's suggestion that Google should "prevent its web crawler from indexing
infringing websites and [should] block access to infringing images . . .").
204. See, e.g., Mike Collett-White, Prince to Sue YouTube, eBay over Music Use, REU-
TERS, Sept. 13, 2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSLl364328420070914; D.T. Max,
The Injustice Collector, THE NEW YORKER, June 19, 2006, at 35 (describing how James
Joyce's grandson felt that memorization of a portion of Finnegan's Wake infringed the estate's
copyright).
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